Integrated Environment for Verifying and Running Distributed Components by Henrio, Ludovic et al.
Integrated Environment for Verifying andRunning
Distributed Components
Ludovic Henrio, Oleksandra Kulankhina, Siqi Li, Eric Madelaine
To cite this version:
Ludovic Henrio, Oleksandra Kulankhina, Siqi Li, Eric Madelaine. Integrated Environment for
Verifying andRunning Distributed Components. Perdita Stevens; Andrzej Wasowski. Fun-
damental Approaches to Software Engineering, Apr 2016, Eindhoven, Netherlands. Springer,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9633, pp.66-83, 2016, Fundamental Approaches to Soft-
ware Engineering. <http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783662496640>. <10.1007/978-3-
662-49665-7 5>. <hal-01303557>
HAL Id: hal-01303557
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01303557
Submitted on 18 Apr 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Integrated environment for verifying and
running distributed components
Ludovic Henrio1, Oleksandra Kulankhina1,2, Siqi Li3, and Eric Madelaine1,2
1 Univ. of Nice Sophia Antipolis, CNRS, France,
Ludovic.Henrio@cnrs.fr
2 INRIA Sophia Antipolis Me´dite´ranne´e, France
{Oleksandra.Kulankhina, Eric.Madelaine}@inria.fr
3 Shanghai Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Computing, ECNU, Shanghai, China
cathy.lsq09@gmail.com
Abstract. This paper targets the generation of distributed applications
with safety guarantees. The proposed approach starts from graphical
specification formalisms allowing the architectural and behavioral de-
scription of component systems. From this point, the user can auto-
matically verify application properties using model-checking techniques.
Finally, the specified and verified component model can be translated
into executable Java code. We implement our approach in a tool suite
distributed as an Eclipse plugin. This paper also illustrates our approach
by modeling and verifying Peterson’s leader election algorithm.
1 Introduction
Component-oriented programming has become a popular approach for distributed
application development. Components enforce a clear design and specification
stage of the applications, and provide a solid basis for safe and modular devel-
opment of complex systems. This work aims at including systematic verification
of behavioral properties in the development process of component-based appli-
cations. For this purpose we would like to provide the developers of distributed
component-based systems with a set of tools supporting rigorous design and
implementation of safe applications. Our tools should guide the user through
all crucial phases of component software development: from application design
specification to verification of the designed architecture and behavior properties
as well as automated code generation.
Applying static analysis on hand-coded programs is complex and often im-
precise, especially for distributed systems. Instead we chose a Model-Driven En-
gineering and a component-oriented approach in which the structure of the ap-
plication is directly specified by the developer, and in which the final code is
generated automaticaly, partialy or totaly.
VerCors4 is a software platform which aims at supporting the creation of safe
distributed component-based applications. VerCors5 includes a set of graphical
4 https://team.inria.fr/scale/software/vercors/vcev4-download/
5 Not to be confused with http://fmt.cs.utwente.nl/research/projects/VerCors/
designers based on UML where the user can specify the architecture and the
business logic of his application, and check the static correctness of the compo-
nent architecture [1]. The specification is then automatically transformed into a
behavior graph that can be model-checked to prove its correctness. We rely on
model-checking for verification, but we want to hide as much as possible the com-
plexity of the underlying formal techniques to make our tools accessible to non-
experts in model-checking. VerCors uses parametrized networks of asynchronous
automata (pNets) as an intermediate format for behavior modeling and relies on
CADP [2] model-checker to verify temporal properties. Last, Java code of the
modeled application can be automatically generated and executed. We rely on
ProActive6 and the Grid Component Model (GCM) [3]. We chose GCM/ProAc-
tive because it targets distributed systems and features a well-defined semantics.
Because of the chosen verification methodology, the current platform can only
verify finite-state systems, but infinite-space systems can already be specified,
modeled as pNets, and executed.
This paper shows that our approach is suitable for applications involving
complex interactions between processes but without too much computational
complexity. For the case studies involving such a computational complexity the
model-checking approach might be limited. However in that case we advocate
the use of the VerCors platform to specify and verify the core of the applica-
tion, abstracting away computational details. The user can still generate the
executable skeleton of the verified core application. He can then extend it with
computational details. While the application logic is unchanged, the behavioral
properties will still be valid.
The VerCors platform has already undergone several major generations, with
significant evolutions for the underlying semantic model, as well as the modeling
platform and the specification formalisms. The original version was using UML
component structures for describing the application architecture, but this was
too far from GCM needs, hence a new DSL and graphical formalism were de-
fined. At the same time, aiming at better support for maintenance and usability,
VerCors was moved to an Eclipse-based environment [4]. A series of publications
described the support for several features of distributed component-based sys-
tems, including group communications, first-class futures, and reconfiguration.
At that time, the platform was only able to generate part of the behavioral
model and it relied on several manual steps only realizable by experts in formal
methods. No code generation was supported. Starting from that preliminary
work a new VerCors tool is presented in this paper. It includes the full set of
modeling formalisms (architecture, types abstractions, and state-machines), the
validation of static correctness, the full chain of tools for the generation of a
pNet model for model-checking, as well as a new tool for automatic generation
of executable GCM/ProActive code. More recently, theoretical papers defining
the pNet model [5] and the behavioral semantics of GCM in terms of pNets [6]
were published. They build a formal foundation for the VerCors tools.
6 https://team.inria.fr/scale/software/proactive/
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First, Section 2 presents the background on GCM, the pNets formalism and
our use-case (Peterson’s leader election algorithm). In Section 3 we introduce
a set of graphical formalisms to define abstractions of distributed component-
based system architecture and behavior. In Section 4 we show how the speci-
fied models can be transformed into behavioral graphs accepted as input by a
model-checker. We present in Section 5 the generation of executable code from
the model specification. Finally, we discuss the related work in Section 6 and
conclude in Section 7. We illustrate our contributions by modeling, verifying,
and running Peterson’s leader-election algorithm7[7]. An extended version has
been published as a research report [8]; it includes appendices with details on
the usecase, the architecture of the tool, and the generation process.
2 Background
2.1 Grid Component Model and ProActive platform
The Grid Component Model (GCM) [3] targets large-scale distributed compo-
nent systems. Its reference implementation is GCM/ProActive.
Architecture. A GCM application consists of components, interfaces and bind-
ings. Figure 2 illustrates an example of a GCM system. A component can be ei-
ther composite (it consists of other subcomponents), e.g. Application, or prim-
itive (a simple element encapsulating business code), e.g. Comp1. Components
communicate through interfaces of two types: client and server (e.g. C1 and S1
correspondingly). A component sends requests and receives replies through client
interfaces; a component receives requests and sends back results through server
interfaces. The interfaces that communicate are connected with bindings.
ProActive is a Java library for distributed computing. Every component in
GCM/ProActive is an active object made of a single applicative thread.
Informal semantics of ProActive components. Figure 1.a illustrates treat-
ment of requests by primitive components. Every primitive component has a
FIFO request queue, a body and an active object that serves requests. All re-
quests to the server interfaces are first dropped to the queue. The body takes
the first request from the queue and triggers the execution of the correspond-
ing method of the active object. To process a request the component may need
additional services provided by the other components, using operations calls on
its client interfaces. Once a request is served, the component sends back a reply
consisting of the value returned by the method. Then, the next can be served.
Figure 1.b illustrates the behavior of a GCM/ProActive composite. A com-
posite has a FIFO request queue, a body, an associated active object, and some
subcomponents. The body takes requests from the queue and forwards them to
the subcomponents that serve them. In order to serve a request, a subcomponent
may need to call methods of other subcomponents or outside of the composite,
using client interfaces. Once a request has been served by the subcomponent, the
composite receives the reply and forwards it to the requester. Every request sent
7 available at: https://github.com/Scale-VerCors/VCEv4/tree/master/Examples
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Fig. 1. GCM/ProActive component behavior
from a subcomponent towards the outside of a composite passes by the queue
of the composite before being forwarded through the composite client interface.
GCM components communicate using futures. When a component sends a
request to another component, the caller continues its execution as long as it does
not need the result of the request. When the result is needed the caller blocks
automatically. We call this behavior a ”wait-by-necessity”. In the meantime, an
empty object called future represents the result of the request.
2.2 pNets
Parametrized networks of asynchronous automata (pNets) have been formalized
in [5]. pNets are composition of labeled transition systems with parameters; they
are used as an intermediate model for encoding behavior of GCM-based applica-
tions. The behavioural semantics of GCM has been formalized in [9,6]. A pNet is
a hierarchical structure where leaves are pLTSs. A pLTS is a labelled transition
system with variables, where labels are of the form 〈α, eb, (xj := ej)j∈J〉, where
eb is a guard, the variables xj ∈ P are assigned when the transition is triggered,
finally α is a parametrized action that has a label and a set of arguments, some of
them are input variables, others are output expressions. By convention, we anno-
tate actions with ”!” and ”?” depending on the information flow. We assume that
the information goes from !α to ?α. A pNet is either a pLTS or the composition
of several pNets; in the second case, the possible interaction between sub-entities
are specified by synchronisation vectors: pNet , pLTS | 〈〈L, pNeti∈Ii ,SVk∈Kk 〉〉
where L is the set of global actions, pNeti∈Ii is the family of sub-pNets. SV
k∈K
k
is a set of synchronization vectors. SVk = α
j∈Jk
j → α′k means that each of the
sub-pNets in the set Jk can perform synchronously an internal action αj ; this
results in a global action α′k. Elements not taking part in the synchronization
are denoted − as in: < −,−, α,− >→α.
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2.3 Peterson’s leader election algorithm
Distributed processes often need to select a unique leader. Peterson’s election
algorithm [7] can be used for this purpose in a unidirectional ring of asynchronous
processes. Every process participating in the elections has a FIFO queue and
the order of sent messages is preserved by the communication channels. Each
process can be either in active mode if the process participates in the election,
or in passive mode if it only forwards messages. Initially, every process stores a
unique number that will be modified during the election. The processes exchange
two rounds of messages so that every active process learns the numbers stored
by the two nearest active processes preceding it. If the maximum of the two
previous values and the value held by the current process is the value received
from the nearest predecessor of the process, then the active process takes this
value as its own value; otherwise the process becomes passive. The rounds of
messages and local decision steps are repeated until a process receives its own
number, this process is the leader.
In details, every process P stores variables max(P ) and left(P ). Max(P ) is
the number stored by P . Left(P ) is the number of the active process on the
left of P . Processes exchange messages of the form M(step, value) where step
is the phase of the algorithm. At the preliminary phase, each process Pi sends
M(1,max(Pi)) to its neighbor. Then, if an active process Pi receives a message
M(1, x) and x is equal to its own number, the process is the leader, otherwise it
assigns x to left(Pi) and sends M(2, x) to its neighbor. When an active process Pi
receives M(2, x) it compares left(Pi) to x and max(Pi). If left(Pi) is greater than
both values, Pi assigns left(Pi) to max(Pi) and sends M(1,max(Pi)); otherwise
Pi becomes passive.
3 Graphical designer
VerCors includes a graphical designer for modeling component-based system ar-
chitecture and behavior. These models must be precise enough to be translated
into both input for validation and for executable code. The graphical specifica-
tion part of VerCors is based on EclipseIDE; it was implemented using Sirius8.
The VerCors platform includes graphical designers for four types of diagrams:
Components, UML Class, UML State Machine, and Type diagrams. This section
describes the four editors and the way they are integrated.
3.1 Architecture specification
Component diagrams are used for the specification of a distributed application
architecture. A component diagram includes primitives (grey boxes), and com-
posites (white rectangles with grey border). Interfaces are attached to the bor-
ders of their containers. An interface has a set of characteristics, e.g. whether an
8 Sirius is an open-source Eclipse project for development of graphical modeling envi-
ronment based on EMF and GMF: http://www.eclipse.org/sirius/
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Fig. 2. Components diagram
interface is server or client. The icon representing an interface changes depending
on the characteristics. Bindings are shown as arrows between interfaces.
UML Class diagrams are used to specify the list of attributes stored by
components and the list of operations a component offers. The user can attach
a UML class to a primitive component and a UML interface to client and server
interfaces. If a class is attached to a component, it means that the attributes
of the class are stored by the component and the operations of the class define
the business logic of the component. A UML interface attached to a client or a
server GCM interface stores the list of operations that can be called and served
with this interface. Each operation defined in a class either has a reference to
the operation of the interface it implements (or redefines in UML terms), or is
a local method of the component.
The types of operations, attributes, and variables can be declared using Type
diagrams. Enumerations, integer intervals, records (C-like structs) and infinite
integers can be specified, while boolean and void types are created by default.
Use-case example The Component diagram representing the architecture of our
use-case model is shown on Figure 2.
Application is a composite; it includes four primitives that participate in the
leader election process. The primitives are connected in a ring topology and have
similar structure. The entry point of the system is the runPeterson() operation of
Application server interface S1. This request is forwarded to Comp4 that triggers
the election process. During the election, components invoke method message on
their client interfaces C1. As defined in Section 2.3, each message transmits two
parameters: step and val. The message is transmitted to the server interface S1 of
the called component. The signature of message is specified in a UML interface
ElectionItf. If a component decides to become a leader or a non-leader, it
reports its decision to the environment by invoking an IAmTheLeader(cnum) or
an IAmNotTheLeader(cnum) method on its client interface C2. These operations
take the identifier of the component as a parameter.
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All four components have the same set of attributes. They have the mes-
sage(...) method implementing the leader election algorithm and a set of meth-
ods to access local attributes. Comp4 implements an additional operation run-
Peterson(). Comp1, Comp2, and Comp3 are implemented by Class0 while Comp4
uses Class1 that extends Class0 with runPeterson() operation. Initially, the
components should have different default values of attribute max and cnum. cnum
is a static unique identifier of a component. To specify the values of those at-
tributes for every component individually, we define them in the Attributes
field represented as a green box in every primitive definition.
In our model we define two integer interval types on Type diagram : StepIn-
terval = 0..2 for the parameter step of messages and IntInterval = 1..4 for the
component unique identifier.
3.2 Behavior specification
UML State Machine diagrams are used for behavior specification in VerCors.
Each State Machine defines the behavior of an operation of a UML Class.
A State Machine has a set of states connected by transitions. A state stores
its name, while logic code is specified on transitions. To enable behavioral anal-
ysis we specify the syntax of UML transitions: a transition has a label of the
form [guard]/action1....actionN where Guard is a boolean expression and
an action is an assignment or a method call (to a local operation or a client
interface). This set of actions is sufficient to encode any behaviour of distributed
objects; control structures have to be encoded as guards on transitions.
The VerCors UML-based editors are based on Obeo UML Designer9. In par-
ticular, we integrated the State Machines graphical designer of Obeo UML De-
signer into VerCors, adding local variable declarations. A State Machine has
access to its own local variables, to the client interfaces and to local methods of
the component which behavior the State Machine describes. A State Machine
can access the attributes of the component but only through getters and setters.
Figure 3 illustrates the State Machine of the message method of Peterson’s
leader election algorithm. It uses seven variables where step and val are input
parameters of the method. The initial state is illustrated with a blue circle. First,
Choice6 checks the phase of the election algorithm. If the algorithm is in the
preliminary (zero) phase either the component is active – it already participates
in the election – or the component triggers the election process on its neighbor
and performs the preliminary phase described in Section 2.3. If it is not the
preliminary phase, either the component is passive and the message is forwarded
to the neighbor [isActive==false]/C1.message(step,val), or the actions of
the State Machine correspond to the two cases M(1, x) or M(2, x) depending on
the value of step (see Section 2.3).
To illustrate future-based communications in VerCors, we extend our use-
case as follows. If a component decides to become the leader, it sends a re-
questKey() invocation on its client interface (see the transition from State10 to
9 http://www.umldesigner.org/
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Fig. 3. Message State Machine
State12). The request is forwarded to outside of Application. Then, the com-
ponent claims itself as the leader by sending an IamTheLeader(cnum) request.
Finally, the component calls its local method encrypt(key) using the result of
requestKey() as a parameter. The component should be able to claim itself as
the leader before it receives the result of requestKey(). However, it cannot exe-
cute encrypt(key) if the key is not obtained. The VerCors user does not need to
explicitly model future-based communications. Whenever a State Machine has
a non-void client method invocation, it is interpreted as a future-based one.
To conclude, four integrated diagram editors are implemented in VerCors.
Component diagrams correspond to architecture specification, Class diagrams
represent attributes and method signatures of components, State Machine dia-
grams are used for behavior specification, and Type diagrams define type ab-
stractions. They allow the user to easily describe his/her application and provide
sufficient input both for model-checking and for code generation.
4 Behavior verification
From user-defined architecture and behavior models VerCors produces input
data for the CADP [2] model-checker following a chain of transformations pre-
sented in this section. First, we analyze input models and generate a corre-
sponding pNet structure. Second, we generate a finite graph given as an input
to CADP, together with auxiliary scripts for managing state-space explosion.
Finally, the user can specify the properties that he wants to check on the gener-
ated graph and run CADP. While the specified system and the pNet model rely
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on parameterized state-machines potentially featuring infinite state-space, the
model-checking phase can handle finite state-space only. As a consequence, the
correctness of the finite abstraction should be checked by abstract interpretation
techniques. From another point of view, the pNet model could also be checked
by a different tool that handles infinite state-space.
4.1 From application design to pNets
We present here the generation of pNets specifying the application behavior [6].
A pNet of a primitive assembles pLTSs of two types: the generic ones whose
structure is identical for all primitives (e.g. queue, body) and the pLTSs gener-
ated from the user-defined State Machines (server and local methods behavior).
Figure 4 shows the pNet generated for Comp1 of our use-case. An Attribute
controller pLTS is generated for each attribute of a primitive; it allows stor-
ing and modifying the value of this attribute. The list of component attributes
can be derived from the UML Class of the component. Proxy and Proxy-
Manager pLTSs are generated for every client operation having a non-void
result. They model the implementation of the futures mechanism. A pLTS is
generated for each server and local method. For this purpose we translate
UML State Machines specifying methods behavior into pLTSs. To translate a
State Machine into a pLTS we first map each state of a State Machine into
a pLTS state and each transition to one or several pLTS transition (poten-
tially adding intermediate states). For example, a State Machine transition [isAc-
tive==true]/max:=this.get max() involves one guard condition and two actions:
a call to a local function get max and a return of its result. A pLTS transition
can perform at most one action, hence, the result of the translation will consist
in two sequential transitions.
The behavior of the components is modeled by synchronization vectors, ex-
pressing the synchronization and the data flow between pLTSs. As an example,
the Body and the Queue pLTSs of a primitive are synchronized using:
<!Serve message(...), ?Serve message(...),−,−,−,−,− >→ Serve message(...)
in which, the subnets occur in the following order:
< Queue,Body,message,max ac, cnum ac, left as, isActive ac > .
Synchronization of the Queue with the environment under reception of a request
is expressed by: <?Q message(...),−,−,−,−,−,− >→?Q message(...) , meaning
that this action is exposed at the next level of pNet to synchronize with an-
other pNet. The other vectors synchronize the following entities: the Body and a
server method pLTS (Call message(...)); a server method pLTS and other local
methods, or client method of the environment; the server method, the Body and
the environment to return the result (R message(...)); the environment and the
Queue when the Queue is saturated, raising an Error queue event.
The pNet of a composite assembles pLTSs for queue, body and sub-entities
enabling futures mechanism with pNets of the subcomponents. The request re-
ception mechanism is similar to the one of a primitive. The only difference is
that the body is synchronized with subcomponent pNets in order to forward
them the requests. pNets of subcomponents are synchronized with each other
9
Fig. 4. pNet of Comp1 Fig. 5. pNet of Application
under internal method invocation (e.g. Comp4 Comp1 message(...)) and result
reception. If a subcomponent invokes an operation outside of the composite, it
synchronizes with the composite queue. Then, the queue synchronizes with the
environment and forwards the request to outside of the composite.
Scenario. The user can specify a Scenario State Machine, encoding the le-
gal sequences of actions performed by the environment, accessing only the server
interfaces of the root component. The scenario of our use-case calls the runPeter-
son method on interface S1 of Application once. The scenario State Machine is
translated into a pLTS and synchronized with the queue of the root component.
This leads to a much smaller and meaningful behavior model.
4.2 From pNets to Model-Checking
Generation of verification input. As the next step, VerCors translates the
pLTSs into the Fiacre format [10] and the synchronization vectors into EXP [11].
Then, the FLAC compiler translates the Fiacre specification into Lotos code.
Finally the CADP front-end generates a labelled transition system in a format
that can be used by the CADP model-checker. We generate a set of scripts for
managing the execution of all steps: communication hiding, minimization, and
hierarchical product using EXP files. In order to limit the state-space explosion
phenomenon inherent to explicit-state model-checkers, the user should:
• use a scenario to limit acceptable inputs of the modeled system,
• specify the internal actions that he does not want to observe during model-
checking (we generate a script transforming them into internal actions),
• limit the size of the data domains using the Types diagram.
All generated transition systems are minimized using branching bisimulation.
We have used the VerCors model-generation function to produce Fiacre, EXP
and auxiliary scripts for our use-case. Table 1 presents size information for some
of the intermediate behavior graphs. The last line is for the hierarchical con-
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Table 1. Behavior graph files (all with Queue size of 3)
Graph States Transitions Computation time
Behaviour of Comp4 3.217.983 45.055.266 2m48.520s
Comp4 (after hiding and minimization) 90.821 1.306.138 5m23.030s
full application 296 661 47m1.673s
struction of the full model of the application (including the Scenario), and the
time includes the whole model-generation workflow. The time needed to generate
Fiacre, EXP files and scripts from VerCors is neglectible.
Model-checking. We use the Model Checking Language (MCL [12]) to express
the behavioral properties we want to prove on our system. MCL is a very expres-
sive logic including first order predicates for the data part, and the alternation
free µ-calculus for branching time logics. On top of MCL, we use Specification
Patterns [13] for easier expression of some usual temporal logic properties, as in
the examples below. We recall that in our example the properties are evaluated
in the context of the scenario where the election algorithm is triggered.
First, we check that after a call to runPeterson(), it is inevitable (under
fairness hypothesis) that either the leader is elected or one of the queues is
saturated. The model-checker answers true: the election terminates. We also
proved that with adequate queue size, they never saturate.
[’Call RunPeterson’] Inev (’Q IamTheLeader.*’ or ’ErrorQueue.*’)
Then, we prove that the event Q IamTheLeader is emitted only once:
Absence Before (’Q IamTheLeader.*’, ’Q IamTheLeader.*’)”
In order to check that the communications in the generated graph are indeed
implementing futures properly, we verify the following formula which states that
a key is always received before IamTheLeader() is invoked:
Existence Between(’R RequestKey.*’, ’Q requestKey.*’, ’Q IamTheLeader.*’)
The model-checker answers false and provides an example of system be-
havior where IamTheLeader() method is invoked before the key is received. This
proves that a component is not blocked if the key is not needed.
To summarize, from the graphical models provided by the user we automat-
ically generate a behavior description in the form of pNets, and translate these
into an input for CADP verification tools. We tested our approach on our use-
case and proved by model-checking the correctness of the application, including
its safety, termination, and functional correctness.
5 Code generation and execution
5.1 Executable code generation
From the specified architecture and behavior we automatically generate exe-
cutable code. We produce an ADL (XML) file defining architecture, and Java
interfaces and classes files for the implementation of the methods specified by
State Machines. This code can be run using the GCM/ProActive Java library.
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Listing 1.1. Generated Java code of message
1 Boolean i sAc t i v e = null ;
2 In t eg e r l e f t = null , max = null , cnum = null ;
3 State curState = State . I n i t i a l ;
4 while ( true ) {
5 switch ( curState ) {
6 . . .
7 case Choice2 :
8 i f ( i sAc t i v e == true ) {
9 max=this . get max ( ) ;
10 curState = State . Choice5 ;
11 break ; }
12 else i f ( i sAc t i v e == fa l se ) {
13 C1 . message ( step , va l ) ;
14 curState = State . State13 ;
15 break ; } . . . } ;}
We generate a Java interface for every UML interface and a Java class for
every UML class. We translate each State Machine attached to a method into
Java code. To do this we use a Java enumeration representing the state machine
steps, a local variable curState holds the current state of the state machine
and actions are taken depending on this state. Listing 1.1 shows a skeleton of
the encoding of the message operation from Figure 3. Note that if-else state-
ments are used for states with more than one outgoing transition. For exam-
ple in Choice 2, the guard label [isActive==false] is translated as an if-else
statement in line 12; depending on the result, a message invocation is emit-
ted (corresponding to C1.message(...), line 13) and the value of curState is
updated (line 14). A drawback of this approach is that such code may not be
very convenient for the programmer since do-while, for, while constructs cannot
be written as such in the state machine, but will rather be encoded within the
state structure, separated by case instructions. We also generate skeleton code
for getter and setter methods, which have no associated state machine.
The Java code generated by VerCors relies on futures. To implement their
generation, we analyze the State Machines and mark the variables that store
remote method invocation results. This information is used to generate the types
of those variables and to access their values. For example, the key variable
from our use-case State Machine will be generated with an IntWrapper type10.
Then the statement this.encrypt(key) requires the value of key and it will be
translated to the following Java code: this.encrypt(key.intValue()).
5.2 Code execution
We generated ProActive/Java code of our use-case example; the resulting ex-
ecution is shown in Figure 611. Black arrows represent request emissions (the
10 basic types need to be wrapped to enable future-based commnuications
11 We use a dedicated tool for the visualization of ProActive program execu-
tion: https://github.com/scale-proactive/A-viewer-tool-for-multiactive-objects.git
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Fig. 6. Code execution
figure only shows some of them). Yellow and blue rectangles show request pro-
cessing. For example, we can see how the call to runPeterson of Application
is transmitted to Comp4 and at the end of the runPeterson request processing
Comp4 triggers the elections on Comp1 by calling message(0,1). At the end of
the algorithm execution we can see how Comp3 reports to the Application that
it is not the leader and Comp1 claims to be the leader.
To sum up, from the specification provided by the user VerCors automatically
produces executable ProActive/Java code. We generated and executed code of
our use-case model and we observed expected behavior of the produced system.
The generated code is guaranteed to verify the temporal properties proven on the
model. It can either be used as it is or serve as code skeleton if the programmer
wants to add computational steps that he did not include in the model.
6 Related Work
There exist a number of languages, formalisms, and tools aiming at verifica-
tion and safe code generation, we focus here on the ones that are dedicated to
distributed systems and composition of distributed systems.
BIP (Behavior Interaction Priority) [14] allows rigorous design of complex
component-based systems. BIP is supported by a toolset including translators
of various source models to BIP, code generators, and verification mechanisms.
BIP focuses on the design of systems based on the notion of interacting entities
whereas our approach takes the point of view of the software developer, using
classical UML-based descriptions augmented only by our graphical DSL for ar-
chitecture, relying on notions the user knows well. Our approach is closely tied to
the notion of distributed components interacting by requests and replies; while
this reduces the field of applicability of our work, it allows us to generate the
component interaction automatically, without additional input from the user.
Cadena[15] is a platform for the development of component-based applica-
tions, initially targeted for the Corba Component Model (CCM), and more re-
cently extended to support Open-CCM, EJBs, and sensor networks specified
with the nesC language. Cadena allows the user to specify component types,
define and analyze inter-component dependencies, specify and model-check cor-
rectness properties, generate code in the various component formalisms, and
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even specify new user-defined component models. Unlike VerCors, it does not
manage hierarchical components, so it could not be used for Fractal or GCM.
Palladio [16] is a tool for design, analysis and generation of hierarchical large-
scale component-based systems. Palladio has less restrictions on types and allows
more expressive modeling than VerCors. However, while Palladio has strong em-
phasis on simulation and system performance prediction, our approach benefits
from the use of formal methods for validation.
Creol [17] is an object-oriented programming language based on concurrent
objects that communicate asynchronously. Creol is supported by the Credo [18]
toolset. In Credo the application description relies on Reo [19]. Credo provides
an abstract but executable model of the application. Then, a test specification
is derived to check compatibility between the two models. Creol is supported by
a type-checker, a simulation and model-checking platform based on Maude. In
VerCors we rely on UML-based formalisms, better known by the programmers
than Reo. We also directly generate efficient code that can be executed on large-
scale distributed infrastructures.
SOFA 2 [20] is a framework for distributed hierarchical component-based
systems development. SOFA 2 is supported by a tool set comprising graphical
designers and behavior validation instruments. SOFA 2 supports dynamic archi-
tectures, multiple communication styles and transparent distribution with the
help of software connectors. Validation in SOFA 2 relies on behavioral protocols
that are easy to understand for the programmer. This provides developers with
validation capacities that require no expertise in any general logical formalism,
though the expressivity may be lower than with temporal logic.
JHelena is a framework for modeling and generation of executable code of
highly dynamic ensembles of autonomic distributed components that are mod-
eled using Helena [21] technique. Our approach allows modeling systems with
several levels of hierarchy while to our knowledge in Helena approach the com-
position only occurs at one level.
ABS [22] is a formal executable component modeling language supported
by a deductive verification system Key-ABS. ABS is a powerful language for
concurrent object-oriented programming, however it does not support any ar-
chitectural description. The verification pattern is also quite different. Different
tools for ABS either focus on specific properties (absence of deadlock for ex-
ample) or use KeY to specify invariants of the program and verify them. Our
approach allows us to target a wide range of properties while not asking the
programmer to have the expertise necessary to write program invariants.
Concerning actor systems, the related work the closest to ours is Rebeca [23]
that handles both functional and real-time verification. The first main difference
between Rebeca and Vercors is the programming model: Rebeca has no future
and no synchronisation operation, which makes the generation of behavioural
model easier. The second one is that the Rebeca toolset does not provide a
design tool or an execution platform as efficient as Vercors+ProActive. On the
other side, Rebeca has strong results concerning the scalability of the approach,
and the range of systems and of properties handled.
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Several verification tools focus on “real-time aspects” allowing to reason on
the time-sensitive properties [24]. In this section we have focused on the tools
that explicitly handle asynchrony and we have not cited works on real-time
systems in general.
7 Discussion and Perspectives
In this paper we presented our integrated environment for designing and im-
plementing safe component-based systems. Our approach includes three main
aspects. First, we provide graphical formalisms for the application architecture
and the behavior specification, as well as type abstractions. The formalism ex-
tensively uses UML models that makes it easy to learn and use for the program-
mer. Second, we ensure behavioral correctness, by running a model-checker on
the specified model. In practice, we transform graphical models into input for
the CADP model-checker. As a result, the user can verify correctness properties
of the modeled system even if he does not have a strong expertise in formal
methods. Finally, we transform the models into executable application code. We
implemented our approach in the VerCors platform and we tested it by modeling,
verifying, and executing Peterson’s leader election algorithm. Our approach was
illustrated by generating GCM/ProActive code but it would be easy to generate
code for any actor or active-object based language, or more generally any pro-
gramming model made of components interacting by asynchronous requests and
replies. Beyond the academic example of this paper, we have also published a
study of a fault-tolerant protocol [25], showing how to handle scalability issues in
the model-checking activities. In another paper, we showed an industrial-inspired
study [26] in which we handle large state-spaces modeling an application with
dynamic reconfiguration of components.
This paper raises the question of the relation between the semantics of the
handled models: state-machines, pNets, finite-state models, and distributed Java
programs. Previous usecases show that many applications and protocols can be
encoded faithfully and executed correctly. It is not in the scope of this paper
to study the semantic gap between these models or to formally prove that the
behavioral model has the same semantics as the generated code. However, the
formal semantics of ProActive [27], the semantics of pNets [5], and the formal
definition of the translation from GCM to pNets [6] allowed us to check care-
fully that the semantics correspond faithfully. Considering the complexity of the
system, an exhaustive formal proof of bisimulation between the semantics would
require several years.
While creating the VerCors platform we tackled a number of challenges. First,
the choice of the underlying technology was not trivial: we experimented with
the Topcased platform, UML profiles, Eclipse Papyrus, before finding a usable
environment with Sirius. Second, finding an expressive and easy to learn graphi-
cal formalism was a challenging task. We wanted to reuse UML notions as much
as possible, but we realized that we needed our own graphical formalism, and
had to find a way to map a large part of GCM specifications into UML mod-
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els. Finally, the integration of all languages, models and formalisms involved in
modeling, execution and verification was not trivial. For example, we had to the
syntax of State Machine had to be precisely specified to be able to translate them
into Fiacre. Also, the translation between formalisms raised technical difficulties,
some of them detailed in [6] and others related to the Fiacre language.
We are currently working on extensions of the VerCors platform that would
address more features of distributed component-based applications. In particu-
lar, we want to address separation between functional code and application man-
agement and verify the correct interaction between those two aspects. Another
challenge that we plan to address is the expression of the application properties
using a higher level specification language. This should also include the transla-
tion from the model-checker diagnostics back to the user-level formalism, that
is not implemented in the current version. This would make our approach even
more attractive for users non-expert in model-checking.
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